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THE NAVY’S SUPERIOR SUPPLIER INCENTIVE PROGRAM: 




The Department of Defense (DOD) launched the Superior Supplier Incentive 
Program in 2013 to adopt industry best practices on supply and supplier management and 
to explore opportunities to provide the high-performing defense contractors with benefits 
or reliefs that would reduce administrative burdens and streamline processes. The 
Department of the Navy provided an opportunity for its 2014 Superior Suppliers to submit 
white papers suggesting possible reliefs or benefits that would improve efficiency. This 
paper analyzes the 55 proposed benefits using three frameworks—Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) policy analysis, contract management process analysis, and risk-benefit 
analysis—to identify patterns or consistencies. The research reveals that FAR Part 42, 
Contract Management and Audit Services, and the contract management phase represent 
the most frustration for the Superior Suppliers. The results of the analysis can be used as a 
surrogate measure to identify potential improvements in the DOD’s current acquisition 
practices. 
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Firms in industry have a long history of leveraging high-performing suppliers to 
achieve competitiveness, increase profit, and gain efficiency. The firms achieve these 
favorable results through the implementation of effective supply management and supplier 
management programs. Effective supply management and supplier management focus on 
building trust and mutually beneficial partnerships between the buyers and sellers. The 
benefits include reducing uncertainties, risks, and production-related costs; building 
partnerships and trust; and creating success and a win-win outcome for both buyers and 
suppliers.  
The Department of Defense (DOD) recognized the need to improve relationships 
with its defense contractors in order to achieve greater efficiency and better performance 
in DOD acquisition. In 2013, the DOD launched the Superior Supplier Incentive Program 
(SSIP), and in 2014, the DOD announced the first group of defense contractors selected for 
the SSIP. The Superior Supplier selection was based on contractor performance data from 
the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). The purpose of the 
SSIP is to provide recognition to high-performing defense contractors and increase 
competition among all defense contractors.  
In 2014, nine first-tier Navy Superior Suppliers were given the opportunity to 
provide input to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and 
Procurement (DASN [AP]) on the types of benefits to be implemented to increase 
efficiency and productivity in doing business with the DOD. According to the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]), the SSIP 
does not provide a direct competitive advantage or monetary incentives. The program is 
intended to provide first-tier Superior Suppliers with reliefs that streamline administrative 
burdens and eliminate non-value-added requirements for increased efficiency in DOD 
acquisition (Vergun, 2015). 
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Although the types of benefits the Superior Suppliers will receive under the SSIP 
are not yet clear, the program represents a step forward in building trust and improving 
relationships with defense contractors as well as the DOD’s commitment to the Superior 
Suppliers.  
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the proposed benefits by the nine first-
tier Navy Superior Suppliers of 2014 to identify patterns or consistencies in relation to 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) policy, contract management process, and risk-
benefit analysis. Results from the analysis are used to identify any implications for SSIP 
and DOD contract management policy. Furthermore, the results from the analysis can open 
doors for further research on how DOD acquisition regulations and requirements can be 
changed or improved to allow greater efficiency within acceptable risk levels. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The questions that are investigated in this research include the following:  
1. How can the benefits proposed by the Superior Suppliers be analyzed to 
provide insight to Navy acquisition leadership?  
2. What are the implications of the analysis of the Superior Suppliers’ 
proposed benefits for DOD contract management policy?  
D. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
For the first time, the DOD has implemented a policy at the department level to 
incentivize defense contractors to improve performance by offering benefits to selected 
Superior Suppliers. The analysis seeks to gain insights on the proposed benefits in terms 
of FAR policy, the contract management process, and risk-benefit analysis. The analysis 
also seeks to gain an understanding of challenges in the DOD acquisition process from the 
contractors’ perspective. The results of the analysis can be used to identify the areas for 
potential improvement in the DOD’s current acquisition practices.  
The limitations of the research are the small sample size of defense contractors and 
that the source of data is limited to the Navy. First, the data consists of proposed benefits 
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from nine first-tier Superior Suppliers selected for the SSIP in the first year of program 
implementation. Second, this data only represents the Navy’s Superior Suppliers. The SSIP 
is a DOD-wide program. The data analyzed focuses only on the Navy suppliers. Third, due 
to the nature of the SSIP, the data includes only a small number of large defense 
contractors. Last, since the SSIP is a new program, there is no historical data available for 
comparison. Based on these limitations, these proposed benefits and research findings do 
not fully represent all defense contractors, but only a limited number. The major 
assumption is that the research findings can be generalized to all DOD contractors.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This research begins with a thorough review of the literature on supply and supplier 
management and is presented in two parts. The first part includes a discussion of industry 
supply management and supplier management. It begins with a broad discussion of supply 
management and narrows down to supplier management and its four key elements: supplier 
selection, supplier performance appraisal, supplier certification, and supplier development 
(Carter & Choi, 2008, pp. 188–253). The second part of the literature review is a review of 
the DOD’s efforts to incentivize contractors to improve performance by emulating industry 
best practices and implementing a series of initiatives, such as the Better Buyer Power 
(BBP) initiatives. This section also covers the development and implementation of the 
SSIP.  
The Navy provided us with information concerning its Superior Suppliers and the 
proposed benefits. The data analysis reviews the proposed benefits of the Navy’s nine first-
tier Superior Suppliers of 2014. We obtained the sanitized list of proposed benefits from 
the DASN(AP); the list does not contain any company-specific identification information. 
We analyze the data using three frameworks: the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
policy, contract management process, and risk-benefit analysis. The objectives of the 
analyses are to (a) determine if there are consistencies or patterns in the proposed benefits, 
(b) identify parts of the FAR and phases of the contract management process that present 
the most challenges for the Superior Suppliers, and (c) identify potential low-risk and high-
benefit proposals that yield the most value for both the government and Superior Suppliers.  
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F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Chapter II, the literature 
review, addresses supply and supplier management in industry and the DOD. The chapter 
also examines the benefits of supply management and supplier management to both buyers 
and sellers and introduces industry best practices. Additionally, it illustrates how the DOD 
adopted industry best practices to incentivize defense contractors to improve performance. 
Chapter III, which covers the methodology, explains the source, access, and analysis of the 
data. This chapter also discusses the three frameworks used for analyzing the data. Chapter 
IV includes the findings of the data analysis, discusses the implications of the results, and 
provides recommendations to Navy acquisition leadership. The last chapter, Chapter V, 
summarizes the research, answers the research questions, provides the authors’ 
conclusions, and presents areas for future research.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review, which is presented in two parts, addresses the supply and 
supplier management programs of industry and the DOD. The first part focuses on industry 
supply and supplier management programs, specifically the definitions, benefits, 
development, and key elements of the programs. The second part is focused on the DOD’s 
efforts to emulate industry’s best practices of supplier management. This section 
specifically discusses the DOD’s Superior Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP).  
B. INDUSTRY SUPPLY MANAGEMENT 
This section of the literature review discusses industry supply management with a 
focus on supplier management. It covers (a) the definition of supply management; (b) the 
background, history, and evolution of supply management; (c) the benefits of supply 
management to buyers and suppliers; (d) supply base rationalization and optimization; and 
(e) key elements of supplier management.  
1. Supply Management Defined  
The Institute for Supply Management (ISM) defined supply management as “the 
identification, acquisition, access, positioning and management of resources and related 
capabilities the organization needs or potentially needs to attain its strategic objectives” 
(Carter & Choi, 2008, p. 2). It is a comprehensive approach that involves the management 
of the entire supply chain operation, which includes “disposition/investment recovery, 
distribution, inventory control, logistics, manufacturing supervision, materials 
management, packaging, product/services development, purchasing/procurement, quality, 
receiving, strategic sourcing, transportation/traffic/shipping and warehousing” (Carter & 
Choi, 2008, p. 10). Monczka, Handfield, Giunipero, and Patterson (2011) defined supply 
management as “a strategic approach to planning for and acquiring the organization’s 
current and future needs through effectively managing the supply base, utilizing a process 
orientation in conjunction with cross-functional teams (CFTs) to achieve organizational 
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missions” (p. 11). Based on these definitions, successful firms treat supply management as 
a key consideration in their overall business strategy planning. Firms are more likely to 
achieve strategic success if they adopt a comprehensive approach and proactively engage 
in every aspect of the supply management programs.  
Effective supply management programs are based on cooperative management of 
“inter-organizational relationships for the benefit of all parties involved and to maximize 
the efficient use of resources in achieving the organization’s customer-service goals” 
(Carter & Choi, 2008, p. 9). Therefore, supply management programs that benefit all 
participants are more likely to succeed. The next section discusses how supply management 
has evolved over time.  
2. Evolution of Supply Management 
The field we call supply management today evolved from the purchasing and 
procurement function that was traditionally performed by a firm’s purchasing department. 
Beginning in the 1980s, firms have become increasingly aware of the strategic importance 
of supply management and recognized the negative aspects of the traditional purchasing 
and procurement approach to the buyer-supplier relationship and the need for a new supply 
management concept (Carter & Choi, 2008, pp. 2–3; Monczka et al., 2011, pp. 42–44). 
Carter and Choi (2008) explained that the traditional purchasing and procurement 
function was “reactive and mechanical” because the purchase agents simply took orders 
from their customers, then followed the “well-delineated guidelines” to process these 
requirements (p. 2). Contrary to this traditional view, the new supply management concept 
is “proactive, strategic, and involved in a much broader spectrum of responsibilities” 
(Carter & Choi, 2008, p. 2). According to Rendon (2005), the traditional purchasing and 
procurement approach focused on obtaining the lowest possible price and, as a result, firms 
treated their suppliers as adversaries and kept them at an “arms-length distance” (p. 297). 
Additionally, “purchasing managers’ performance was measured based on their abilities to 
reduce the purchased price of supplies and services” (Rendon, 2005, p. 297).  
These changes of market phenomenon and in buyer-supplier relationships were best 
explained by Kraljic (1983):  
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Threats of resource depletion and raw materials scarcity, political 
turbulence and government intervention in supply markets, intensified 
competition, and accelerating technological change have ended the days of 
no surprises. As dozens of companies have already learned, supply and 
demand patterns can be upset virtually overnight. (p. 109)  
As a result, buying firms increasingly depend on reliable suppliers to provide uninterrupted 
and high quality material to support business success and profitability.  
According to Liker and Choi (2004), “the 100 biggest U.S. manufacturers spent 48 
cents out of every dollar of sales in 2002 to buy materials compared to 43 cents in 1996” 
(p. 104). The study suggests that “the issue isn’t whether companies should turn their arms-
length relationships with suppliers into close partnerships, but how” (Liker & Choi, 2004, 
p. 106). Increasing dependence on supplier performance to determine business profitability 
forced buying firms to approach the buyer-supplier relationship differently. Long-term 
relationships with reliable suppliers became an important consideration. This change in 
relationship dynamic is reflected in the new supply management concept, which moves 
away from the adversarial approach and considers suppliers as “long-term partners” rather 
than “short-term, easy, expendable and replaceable sources of goods and services” (Carter 
& Choi, 2008, p. 2).  
Japanese automakers Toyota and Honda created well-known success stories in 
managing buyer-supplier relationships to achieve strategic success. According to Liker and 
Choi (2004), the supplier keiretsu, “close-knit networks of vendors that continuously learn, 
improve, and prosper along with their parent companies” (p. 106), was the key element 
behind Toyota and Honda’s strategic successes. Under the supplier keiretsu, the 
automakers worked closely with the selected suppliers to achieve mutually beneficial 
objectives. 
Toyota and Honda implemented the keiretsu model in their North American plants 
and achieved similar successes as in Japan. In a survey conducted in 2003 to measure 
buyer-supplier relations in the U.S. automobile industry, “Toyota and Honda were rated as 
the most preferred companies to work with” (Liker & Choi, 2004, p. 106). They led in 17 
categories, ranging from trust to perceived opportunity, and particularly, “suppliers said 
that Toyota and Honda were better communicators and that they were more trustworthy 
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and more concerned about suppliers’ profitability” (Liker & Choi, 2004, pp. 106–107). 
Both automakers were also leaders in innovation and cost reduction; their vehicles were 
rated highest in initial quality and long-term durability (Liker & Choi, 2004, p. 107).  
Examining the changes in buyer-supplier relationships over time and the experience 
of the Japanese automakers, we can conclude that successful firms invest in supply 
management and leverage suppliers to create greater successes. As explained by Kraljic 
(1983), “the greater the uncertainty of supplier relationship, technological developments, 
and/or physical availability of those items, the more important supply management 
becomes” (p. 110). Effective supply management leads to benefits for both buyers and 
suppliers. The next section of the chapter discusses the benefits of supply management. 
3. Benefits of Supply Management  
Effective supply management brings benefits to both buyers and suppliers. Sheth 
and Sharma (1997) suggested four underlying reasons to establish long-term buyer-
supplier relationships: “increased cost efficiency, increased effectiveness, enabling 
technologies, and increased competitiveness” (p. 95). Monczka et al. (2011) listed six 
benefits of supply management: increasing value and savings, building relationships and 
driving innovation, improving quality and reputation, reducing time to market, generating 
economic impact, and contributing to competitive advantage (pp. 8–10).  
In the traditional purchasing and procurement relationship, there was a high level 
of uncertainty because buyers and sellers were motivated by self-gain. For example, the 
buyer’s goal was to obtain the lowest price, and the seller would lower the product quality 
standards to meet the low price target. To mitigate these defective behaviors, many controls 
needed to be put into place to ensure cooperative behavior and successful transactions. 
Control measures such as additional oversight requirements created inefficiencies and 
costs: “controls increase cost and decrease the efficiency of relationships” (Sheth & 
Sharma 1997, p. 95).  
The new supply management concept allows buyers to move away from the 
adversarial approach with sellers. Under this new concept, buyers seek to build long-term 
partnerships with sellers, and both parties work toward mutually beneficial objectives. 
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Sheth and Sharma’s (1997) study found that “organizational buying is dramatically shifting 
from the transaction oriented to the relational oriented philosophy, and will shift from a 
buying process to a supplier relationship process” (p. 91). The shift in the buyer-seller 
relationship dynamic promotes business integration and encourages investments and 
innovation. It also increases competition because firms seek to lock in good suppliers to 
increase their competitive edge in the market.  
Rendon and Templin’s (1992) study on the National Cash Register (NCR) 
Corporation demonstrated how supply management can benefit both buyers and sellers. 
NCR used the supply line management (SLM) strategy, which is based on “developing a 
limited number of ‘best-in-class’ suppliers as long-term partners. These selected suppliers 
become so thoroughly integrated into NCR’s research and development (R&D) and 
production process that they become extensions of NCR’s engineering and manufacturing 
functions” (Rendon & Templin, 1992, p. 20). Under the SLM arrangement, the buyer and 
sellers entered “a business rapport bound by obligation, investment, and community of 
interest—the purpose of which is to add (create) value” (Rendon & Templin, 1992, 
 p. 20). The result was a win-win outcome for the buyer and suppliers. NCR benefited from 
“consolidating supplier base, decreasing supplier lead times, and cutting inventories” 
(Rendon & Templin, 1992, p. 24), while the suppliers benefitted from “increased business” 
(Rendon & Templin, 1992, p. 24), which allowed them to focus energy on “continuous 
process improvements and searching for additional ways to meet NCR’s supply needs” 
(Rendon & Templin, 1992, p. 24).  
To remain profitable in the dynamic competitive market, firms must have sound 
business strategies supported by effective supply management. Effective supply 
management requires partnership with the right suppliers to ensure reliable resources and 
long-term performance of the organization. However, before an organization can 
effectively establish a supplier management program, it must first determine how many 
suppliers it should maintain, a process called supply base rationalization or optimization. 
The next section discusses supply base rationalization and optimization.  
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4. Supply Base Rationalization and Optimization 
Supply base rationalization is “determining and maintaining the appropriate 
number of suppliers by item/category depending on the risk and value of the item/category” 
(Flynn, Harding, Lallatin, Pohlig, & Sturzl, 2006, p. 165). In general, the first step in supply 
base rationalization is the reduction in the number of suppliers by “[eliminating] both 
marginal and small-purchase-volume suppliers” (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 324). A study 
conducted by Sheth and Sharma (1997) suggested that many American firms went through 
supply base reduction in the 1990s. Figure 1 shows eight American firms’ reduction of 
suppliers. 
Figure 1. Reduction in Number of Suppliers 
 
Source: Sheth, J. N., & Sharma, A. (1997). Supplier relationships: emerging issues and 
challenges. Industrial Marketing Management, 26(2), p. 95. 
Following the initial reduction, the subsequent supply base optimization process 
replaces good suppliers with better suppliers or begins the supplier development process 
to improve supplier performance (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 324).  
According to Monczka et al. (2011), “supply base rationalization and optimization 
should result in real improvement in cost, quality, delivery, and information sharing 
between buyer and supplier” (p. 324). However, supply base reduction is not free of risk. 
Some possible risks include supplier dependency, absence of competition, supply 
disruption, and overaggressive supply reduction (Monczka et al., 2011, pp. 326–328). 
 11 
Despite the risk, most scholars believe that supply base rationalization and optimization 
are necessary steps to achieve effective supplier management and development because 
managing a large supply base requires substantial energy and resources. According to 
Monczka et al. (2011), “supply base rationalization and optimization should be a 
continuous process” (p. 324). A firm should continue to assess the optimal number of 
suppliers based on market condition and risk level.  
Once the supply base rationalization and optimization process is in place, a firm is 
able to approach its supplier management programs effectively. Supplier management 
provides guidance on how to select the right suppliers, evaluate supplier performance, and 
develop mutually beneficial relationships between buyers and suppliers. The next section 
discusses the four key elements of effective supplier management. 
5. Key Elements of Supplier Management  
According to Carter and Choi (2008), “about 70 percent of the organizations that 
responded to an Aberdeen survey noted supplier performance as the key factor that 
critically affects their operational success” (p. 187). Thus, supplier performance has a direct 
impact on organizational performance. There are variations of supplier management 
programs. For the purpose of this paper, we focus our discussion on the Institute for Supply 
Management (ISM) supplier management model. The ISM is the oldest and most 
prominent professional association in supply chain management, and its model includes 
four key elements: supplier selection, supplier performance appraisal or evaluation, 
supplier certification, and supplier development.  
a. Supplier Selection 
Supplier selection determines which suppliers an organization would “establish a 
contract with and engage in a relationship” (Carter & Choi, 2008, pp. 188–190). It 
determines the roles and responsibilities of suppliers and is believed to be the most 
important consideration in supplier management because it involves resource commitment. 
Supplier selection should consider eight major criteria: finances, consistency, relationship, 
flexibility, technological capability, service, reliability, and price (Carter & Choi, 2008, pp. 
188–190).  
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Monczka et al. (2011) approached the supplier selection from the risk management 
perspective and argued that an effective supplier selection program is the key to risk 
management:  
Those organizations that develop a holistic supplier management strategy 
not only are more likely to gain better insights into potential risk areas 
earlier than the competition, they are also more likely to reduce the 
probability of supplier financial and operational challenges disrupting their 
business. (p. 104)  
According to Monczka et al. (2011), there are nine supplier selection criteria: price/cost 
competitiveness, product quality, delivery performance, financial condition, engineering 
and manufacturing technical competence, management of its own suppliers, management 
capability, ability to work with the customer, and potential for innovation (p. 104).  
The two groups of scholars used different terms to describe the supplier selection 
criteria, but both addressed the two key considerations—past performance and future 
business prospects. Clearly, good past performance indicates low risk and high reliability. 
Suppliers with high technological capability, customer satisfaction, and managerial ability 
are desirable partners in future business growth. Table 1 is an example of selection criteria 
as outlined by the ISM (Carter & Choi, 2008, p. 190):  
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Table 1.   Supplier Selection Criteria 
 Selection Criteria 
Finance Financial conditions, profitability of supplier, financial records disclosure, performance awards 
Consistency Conformance quality, consistent delivery, quality philosophy, prompt response 
Relationship Long-term relationship, relationship closeness, communication openness, reputation for integrity 
Flexibility Product or service volume changes, short setup time, short delivery lead time, conflict resolution 
Technological 
Capability Design capability, technical capability 
Service After-sale support, sales representative’s competence 
Reliability Incremental improvement product or service reliability 
Price Low initial price 
Adapted from: Carter, J. R., & Choi, T. Y. (2008). Foundation of supplier management. 
Tempe, AZ: Institute for Supply Management, p. 190. 
In general, firms have reduced the number of suppliers they maintain over the years. 
This reduction allows firms to focus on building relationships and trust with their selected 
suppliers, as well as invest more resources in supplier development. The implication is that 
“the supplier selected [will] become more integrated and enjoy [a] long-term relationship” 
(Carter & Choi, 2008, p. 189). The selected suppliers, however, must continue to perform 
and contribute to business growth after the initial selection to continue enjoying the 
business relationship and benefits. Firms manage supplier performance using established 
supplier performance appraisal or evaluation criteria. The next section discusses how firms 
use supplier performance appraisal to manage relationships with their suppliers.  
b. Supplier Performance Appraisal or Evaluation 
Supplier performance appraisal only applies to selected suppliers that pass an 
overall qualification process. The qualifying categories include customer 
communication/customer relationship management (CRM), supply-chain mapping, quality 
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systems, logistics systems, financial analysis, organization and management, and labor-
management relationship (Carter & Choi, 2008, p. 194). The performance of the supplier 
is an important consideration to the buying firm because of its direct impact on product and 
service qualities. For example, the Ford Motor Company lost $3 billion and caused an 
estimated 250 deaths because its supplier, Firestone, provided defective tires (Carter & 
Choi, 2008, p. 191).  
The supplier performance appraisal requirements differ depending on the size of 
the firm and nature of the product. Large organizations with large numbers of suppliers do 
not evaluate all their suppliers. Developmental or complex products require more thorough 
evaluations than routine or standard products. There are different ways to evaluate supplier 
performance, but effective evaluations should include key criteria such as “capabilities and 
past performance in product design, commitment to quality, management capability and 
commitment, technical ability, cost performance, delivery performance, and the ability to 
develop process and product technology” (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 64). Table 2 is an 
example of evaluation factors and associated questions used in evaluating supplier 
performance. 
Table 2.   Evaluation Factors and Associated Questions 
Factors Questions to Ask 
Capacity/Utilization What is the maximum production or service capacity? How much of that capacity is currently being used? 
Delivery 
Does the supplier have sufficient facilities to deliver the 
required products or services on time? What is its inventory 
policy? Are there any back orders? 
Quality 
Is there evidence of a total quality management (TQM) 
philosophy? What evidence does the organization show in 
terms of quality leadership? Quality-assurance program? 
What are historical internal and external reject rates? 
Make-Buy Program 
Overall, how much of the supplier’s total cost of goods sold is 
coming from the supplier’s suppliers? How much of what is 
being purchased will come from those suppliers? 
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Factors Questions to Ask 
Cycle Time/Lead Time 
What is the range of the cycle/lead times of comparable 
products? How would an advanced scheduling notice improve 
them? 
Productivity 
What is the supplier’s present productivity? Given that 
productivity is defined as the ratio between output and input, 
what is the likelihood of increasing output by keeping the 
same input and decreasing input by keeping the same output? 
Flexibility 
How able and willing is this supplier to make changes? Last-
minute changes? Does the supplier’s leadership have an open 
and flexible attitude? 
References 
Which organizations does the supplier list as references? 
What are their positions in their respective markets? Will they 
be willing and able to provide information on this supplier? 
Electronic Capabilities 
Does the supplier have an enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
system? If so, what is it? If not, how will planning and 
communication take place? Can the supplier handle electronic 
data interchange (EDI) or e-commerce transactions? 
Breadth of Product Line 
Does the supplier have the ability to make multiple items? 
Provide a variety of services? Does it have a flexible 
manufacturing system? If so, how well is it using the 
technology? 
Adapted from: Carter, J. R., & Choi, T. Y. (2008). Foundation of supplier management. 
Tempe, AZ: Institute for Supply Management, pp. 196—197. 
According to Carter and Choi (2008), “the ultimate goal of performance evaluation 
is to make improvements and eliminate problems at the systems level rather than merely 
getting around a symptom of underlying problems” (p. 192). In order for the performance 
appraisal process to work effectively, suppliers must understand how they are being 
evaluated, where they stand, and how to improve. One of the most effective ways to 
communicate these ideas is to use a standardized evaluation process and establish supplier 
categories. The next section discusses the supplier certification process and supplier 
categories.  
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c. Supplier Certification  
According to the ISM, “supplier certification is a way to determine whether a 
supplier has the basic ability to meet the buying organization’s needs for the goods or 
services that it supplies,” and the ultimate goal of supplier certification is to “create 
conformance and maintain control” (Carter & Choi, 2008, p. 200).  
There are three types of supplier certification: (a) international organization 
initiated, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000, a quality-
assurance program that focuses on total quality management; (b) industry-specific, such as 
QS 9000, a quality-assurance system that is specific to the automobile industry suppliers; 
and (c) organizational-specific, which is used by organizations for supplier management 
and development purposes. An example of organizational-specific supplier management 
programs is Boeing’s preferred-supplier certification program. Boeing suppliers are 
evaluated and given scores on the categories of cost, quality, product delivery, leadership, 
technology, and support. Suppliers selected as preferred suppliers enjoy the benefits of 
reduced inspection, industry recognition, and additional business opportunities (Carter & 
Choi, 2008, pp. 200–204).  
There are typically two levels of supplier certification: organizational level and 
product level. Figure 2 shows a general process of supplier certification at the 
organizational level. Organizational level certification is performed by representatives 
from a supply management organization. The process involves communication, 
observation, collaboration, assessment, and continuous process improvement between the 
representative and the supplier. Typically, only certified suppliers can become certified at 
the product level or “parts-certified,” which focuses on the performance of specific parts 
(Carter & Choi, 2008, pp. 204–206).  
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Figure 2. Key Steps in Supplier Certification 
 
Adapted from: Carter, J. R., & Choi, T. Y. (2008). Foundation of supplier management. 
Tempe, AZ: Institute for Supply Management, p. 206. 
One way to manage suppliers effectively is to categorize the suppliers into different 
groups based on the results of the certification process or the suppliers’ performance over 
time. Table 3 is an example of supplier categories (Carter & Choi, pp. 201–202). 
Table 3.   Supplier Categories 
Category Description 
Approved Suppliers that meet the supply management organization’s selection criteria and have been added to the approved list.  
Preferred 
Suppliers that an organization has determined meet its expectations 
for quality, delivery and/or price and that are able to respond to 
unexpected changes 
Partnered 
Suppliers that have a close working relationship with the supply 
management organization in order to attain some advantages from 
each other in a positive way. A partnership in this context does not 
imply a legal relationship. Buyer-supplier partnerships may be of 
operational importance, such as a long-term, single-source 
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Category Description 
relationship with an office supplier, or of strategic importance, such 
as a long-term, single-source relationship with a supplier of a product 
or service of strategic importance. 
Certified Suppliers with quality-control systems that have proved to be highly reliable, thus eliminating the need for incoming inspection. 
Prequalified 
Suppliers that are added to a supply management organization’s 
approved list by passing its preliminary screening and selection 
criteria. 
Certifiable Suppliers that are not currently certified by the supply management organization but show strong evidence to become certified. 
Disqualified 
Individuals, companies or other organizations that fail to meet the 
standards established by a supply management organization and are 
barred from competing for that organization’s business.  
Debarred 
Individuals, companies or other organizations that are suspended, 
usually on a temporary basis, from selling or otherwise doing business 
with a supply management organization. 
Diverse Suppliers that are selected to increase the diversity of a supply management organization’s supply base. 
Adapted from: Carter, J. R., & Choi, T. Y. (2008). Foundation of supplier management. 
Tempe, AZ: Institute for Supply Management, p. 202. 
Supplier certification and supplier categories are used to increase managerial 
efficiency. High performing suppliers receive a higher level of trust and additional business 
opportunities. For suppliers that receive a less than desirable category rating, the supplier 
management organization may decide to develop these suppliers by assisting them with 
product or service improvement. The next section discusses the supplier development 
process and activities.  
d. Supplier Development  
Supplier development is “a systematic effort to create and maintain a network of 
competent suppliers, and to improve various supplier capabilities that are necessary for the 
supply management organization to meet its competitive challenges” (Flynn et al., 2006, 
p. 164). It is also defined as “any effort of a firm to increase performance and/or capabilities 
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to meet the firm’s short and/or long term supply needs” and it can range from “limited 
efforts to extensive efforts” (Krause, 1997, p. 12).  
According to the ISM, the key element in supplier development is the idea of 
continuous improvements that build on each other and eventually lead to significant 
improvement in performance (Carter & Choi, 2008, p, 208). Krause (1997) studied the 
supplier development activities of over 1,500 firms and concluded that the most effective 
supplier development is the “multi-pronged” approach. The multi-pronged approach is the 
combination use of forced competition, incentives, and direct involvement (Krause, 1997, 
p. 18). Some of the most well-known industry supplier development programs, such as 
enterprise resource planning (ERP), Lean Six Sigma, and materials requirements planning 
(MRP), include the key elements mentioned previously: continuous improvement, 
communication, direct involvement, and opportunities for mutual benefits. Figure 3 
illustrates the supplier development process and required actions.  
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Figure 3. Supplier Development Process and Required Actions 
 
Adapted from: Carter, J. R., & Choi, T. Y. (2008). Foundation of supplier management. 
Tempe, AZ: Institute for Supply Management, p. 210. 
Firms often maintain a network of competent suppliers to meet day-to-day business 
requirements. However, in order to preserve a competitive edge, firms sometimes take 
more aggressive approaches to developing new capabilities and new suppliers, a process 
called reverse marketing. Reverse marketing is “an aggressive approach to developing a 
relationship with a supplier in which the buyer takes the initiative in making the proposal 
for the relationship and the specific business transaction” (Flynn et al., 2006, p. 150). The 
key difference between supplier development and reverse marketing is that “supplier 
development emphasizes the organization’s present suppliers and their present capability; 
reverse marketing focuses on new suppliers and new capabilities” (Carter & Choi, 2008, 
p. 211). Additionally, reverse marketing requires the firms to make a direct resource 
commitment in areas such as financial, technical and strategic. Table 4 illustrates the 
differences between reverse marketing and supplier development practices.  
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Table 4.   Comparison of Reverse Marketing and Supplier Development 
Practices 
 Reverse Marketing Supplier Development 
Timeframe  Future Present 
Target Suppliers Suppliers that are motivated but 
currently lack the capability to 
supply necessary parts or 
services 
 
Suppliers that currently are 
supplying parts and services but 





Very high financial, technical, 
and strategic leadership 
commitment 
Moderate technical assistance 
Types of 
Involvement 







Strategic partnership Any type: basic, operational, 
business, or strategic partnership 
Adapted from: Carter, J. R., & Choi, T. Y. (2008). Foundation of supplier management. 
Tempe, AZ: Institute for Supply Management, p. 212. 
Supplier development is a strategic business decision to invest in suppliers to ensure 
long-term organizational competitiveness. Levels of involvement differ depending on 
market conditions, supplier capabilities, and technological requirements. The goal of 
supplier development is to create success and a win-win outcome for both buyers and 
suppliers.  
This section of the literature review was focused on industry supply management, 
including its definition, background, and evolution, as well as the benefits of supply 
management. This section also discussed the idea of supplier rationalization and 
optimization and the four key elements of supplier management. The next section of this 
chapter introduces the DOD’s effort to capture lessons learned and best practices from 
industry on buyer-supplier relationship management. It includes an overview of the DOD-
level initiatives implemented in the recent past and challenges faced. Then it discusses the 
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DOD’s latest effort to incentivize high performance through the implementation of the 
SSIP. 
C. THE DOD’S SUPPLIER MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
This section of the literature review discusses the DOD’s supplier management 
programs as reflected in the Navy’s Superior Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP). This 
section of the literature review discusses the following: (a) the DOD’s implementation of 
supplier management programs, (b) the background and history of the SSIP, (c) the Navy’s 
SSIP, and (d) the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). 
1. The DOD’s Implementation of Supplier Management Programs 
Industries have effectively leveraged their suppliers to create greater efficiencies 
and increase profit through supply management programs. Although the DOD is not a 
profit-driven entity, the DOD recognizes the importance of building relationships with its 
suppliers and motivating them to perform at a high level. Based on industry experiences, 
motivated suppliers contribute to increased productivity, reduced production-related costs, 
and reduced risk, thus creating a win-win outcome.  
Suppliers in industry seek to obtain preferred supplier status with their buyer. The 
biggest incentive to achieve preferred supplier status in industry is to “receive the first 
opportunity for new business” (Monczka, et al., p. 62). However, the DOD’s supplier 
management program cannot mirror industry’s practices due to governing statutes that 
restrict the government from entering into an exclusive contracting relationship with 
defense contractors.  
For example, the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) and FAR 6.101, Full and 
Open Competition, state that the “contracting officer shall provide full and open 
competition through use of the competitive procedure(s),” thus restricting exclusive 
contractual relationships with defense contractors. As a result of this governing statute, the 
DOD has limitations in incentivizing suppliers for the purpose of providing first business 
opportunities without competition. Thus, there are minimal incentives for DOD suppliers 
to perform at a high level when compared to industry.  
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Moreover, the DOD’s SSIP can only emulate some parts of industry’s supplier 
management programs. The SSIP is an attempt by the DOD to take the portion of industry’s 
best practices that is applicable to the DOD and use it as a tool to motivate defense 
contractors to perform at a high level.  
2. Background and History of the DOD’s SSIP 
The DOD’s first attempt to create a superior supplier incentive program was 
through the Navy’s pilot program called the Preferred Supplier Program (PSP). The PSP 
then evolved to the SSIP as part of the DOD’s Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives. This 
section provides a brief background on how the DOD’s supplier incentive programs 
evolved in the last five years.  
a. Preferred Supplier Program 
The PSP started in May 2010 to emulate the preferred supplier programs in 
industry. Although the PSP could not fully emulate the industry’s successful supplier 
management programs, the Navy’s intent was to recover opportunities lost by the 
“decentralized and individual contract approach” that is required by the DOD statutes and 
policies (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Logistics 
Management [DASN(A&LM)], 2010, p. 28,788).  
The basic concept of the PSP, as outlined in the Federal Register (DASN[A&LM], 
2010), is that the preferred supplier status would be obtained through past performance 
reports using CPARS data. Those with preferred supplier status would not be guaranteed 
future contracts; however, they would have an opportunity to “receive more favorable 
contract terms and conditions” (DASN[A&LM], 2010, p. 28,788). The selection process 
and criteria of the PSP is discussed later in this chapter with the SSIP. In order to make the 
PSP successful, the Navy invited the public sector and industry representatives for input 
on the PSP. The Navy’s goal was to develop the PSP into an effective incentive program 
to motivate defense contractors. Appendix A lists the questions asked by the Navy to 
industry (DASN[A&LM], 2010, p. 28,789). 
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b. Better Buying Power Initiatives 
Even with solicitation for input from both the public sectors and industry, the PSP 
was never implemented by the Navy. Nevertheless, the idea of incentivizing suppliers to 
deliver high performance and increase competition was supported by many DOD 
acquisition leaders, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics (USD[AT&L]). The USD(AT&L), along with the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU), developed initiatives to improve the DOD acquisition process, called 
the BBP (Woodruff, 2012, p. 2).  
The BBP initiative was introduced in June 28, 2010, with the theme, “Mandate for 
Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending.” According to the BBP 
website, “The BBP is the implementation of best practices to strengthen the Defense 
Department’s buying power, improve industry productivity, and provide an affordable, 
value-added military capability to the Warfighter” (DOD, n.d., para. 1). The BBP identified 
16 best practices to improve efficiency, and the Navy’s PSP was included. As a result, the 
Navy’s PSP was reintroduced at the DOD level as an initiative to reward excellent 
suppliers. However, while the BBP memorandum included a mandate “to emulate the 
Navy’s PSP” (OUSD[AT&L], 2010, p. 5), it did not provide any information on how to 
implement such a program. For unknown reasons, the Navy’s PSP and the excellent 
supplier reward initiative under the BBP were never implemented by any service.  
Two years after the introduction of the BBP initiative, the USD(AT&L) introduced 
the BBP 2.0, a second version of the BBP, with the theme “Continuing the Pursuit of 
Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending” (OUSD[AT&L], 2013). The 
BBP 2.0 best practices encompassed 36 initiatives organized in seven focus areas. In the 
BBP 2.0, the Navy was assigned to develop a pilot program to incentivize contractors for 
the DOD. An initiative to implement the PSP remained one of the focus areas under a 
different name, the SSIP. From this point forward, preferred suppliers would be called 
Superior Suppliers and the PSP would be the SSIP in accordance with the BBP 2.0. The 
DOD’s continuing effort to incentivize defense contractors for high performance was 
evident with the introduction of the SSIP; however, program implementation has remained 
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a challenge as the DOD must overcome many statutes, regulations, and policies 
restrictions.  
It took almost a year for the SSIP to take another step forward. On June 13, 2014, 
the Navy announced the first list of Superior Suppliers. The Navy’s Superior Suppliers list 
was organized into three tiers. However, only the first-tier companies have an opportunity 
to negotiate benefits that may provide cost savings for the company. The following is the 
list of the Navy’s first-tier Superior Suppliers of 2014: 
x General Dynamics Combat Systems 
x General Dynamics Marine Systems 
x General Electric Aviation 
x Lockheed Mission Systems and Training 
x MHSCo Sikorsky Lockheed Partnership 
x Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems 
x Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems 
x Raytheon Intelligence, Information and Services 
x Rolls-Royce Defense Aerospace (Jayakumar, 2014). 
The USD(AT&L) published the third iteration of the BBP, the BBP 3.0, “Achieving 
Dominant Capabilities through Technical Excellence and Innovation,” on April 9, 2015. 
Every initiative not implemented previously was introduced again with stronger emphasis 
in the new iteration. The SSIP was no exception. In the BBP 3.0, the USD(AT&L) directed 
each service to develop a service-specific SSIP in order to provide flexibility to the SSIP 
that is better suited for each service (OUSD[AT&L], 2015). The SSIP is a relatively new 
initiative for all services. However, the Navy’s SSIP is the most mature incentive program 
within the DOD because of its experience with the PSP. The next section discusses the 
Navy’s SSIP.  
3. The Navy’s SSIP 
The Navy’s SSIP is a revised program from its initial pilot program, the PSP. The 
concept of SSIP’s rating criteria, evaluating method, and possible benefits are similar to 
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the PSP. In this section, we discuss the Navy’s SSIP focus on the rating criteria, evaluation 
method, possible benefits, and CPARS.  
a. Rating Criteria 
The SSIP assessment is based on contractor past performance information using the 
CPARS data and “other sources of data, including information available to the Navy’s 
program offices and government contract administration organizations” (DASN[AP], 
2013, p. 21,117) that can supplement the CPARS data. The evaluation uses three years of 
CPARS data. The performance rating of the most recent year carries more weight than the 
previous two years. The rating is based on a five-star system using the CPARS color rating 
as shown in Table 5. At minimum, the following seven areas are being assessed: technical 
(quality of product), schedule, cost control, management responsiveness, management of 
key personnel, utilization of small business, and other CPARS factors as appropriate 
(DASN[AP], 2013). At least a three-star rating is required to obtain Superior Supplier 
status, while a five-star rating can be only obtained by having an active energy efficiency 
program.  
Table 5.   SSIP Conversion Table 
SSIP Conversion table 





Dark Blue 4 
Adapted from: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Procurement 
(DASN[AP)]). (2013, April). Superior Supplier Incentive Program (FR Doc. 2013–08190). 
Federal Register, 78(68), p. 21,117. 
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b. Evaluation Method 
The Federal Register dated April 9, 2013, explains the evaluation process for the 
Navy’s pilot SSIP: 
DON intends to evaluate the top 15 DON contractors that supply goods and 
the top 15 DON contractors that supply services. The top 15 DON 
contractors will be determined by the value of contract awards for the most 
recent fiscal year at the business unit level. A business unit can only be rated 
in either the goods or services category. In the event a contractor is within 
the top 15 suppliers of both goods and services, it will be evaluated in the 
category that represents the preponderance of sales to the DON. 
(DASN[AP], 2013, p. 21117)  
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy-Acquisition and Procurement 
(DASN[AP]) will oversee the evaluation of Superior Supplier designation by teams 
consisting of the Department of the Navy’s (DON) Echelon II contracting activities. Each 
team will evaluate contractors “based on the volume of contracting activity between a 
contractor under evaluation and a particular contracting activity” (DASN[AP], 2013, p. 
21117). Once selected by the teams, the DASN(AP) will make final recommendations to a 
panel of senior DON leaders. The panel will include the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN[RD&A]) and may include the Vice 
Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and 
Commander, Fleet Forces Command (DASN[AP], 2013).  
c. SSIP Benefits 
The benefit of being selected as one of the Navy’s Superior Suppliers does not 
guarantee automatic contract award by the Navy. Instead, the contractors with Superior 
Supplier status may receive more favorable contract terms and conditions in future DON 
contracts. Some examples of the favorable contract terms and conditions as outlined in the 
April 9, 2013, Federal Register are 
x More favorable progress payments. Adjustments may be made to progress 
payment percentages or retention percentages. 
x Priority for adjudication of final labor and indirect cost rates. 
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x Increase in the intervals between business system reviews.  
(DASN[AP], 2013) 
Multi-unit corporations with multiple business units selected as Superior Suppliers 
may receive additional recognition from the DON. This additional recognition will not be 
in favorable contract terms and conditions, but rather “favorable business practices by the 
DON in its relations at the corporate level” (DASN[AP], 2013, p. 21116).  
To understand the SSIP evaluation process for selecting Superior Suppliers, 
understanding the CPARS is very important. The next section discusses the CPARS 
process.  
d. Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System 
The CPARS is a web-based application designed to be used to record government 
contractors’ performance information based on the “objective facts and supported by the 
program and contract management data” (DPAP, 2015). FAR 42.15 requires collection of 
CPARS data, and FAR Part 15 requires the use of CPARS data as one of the source 
selection criteria for awarding contracts for the purpose of ensuring that “current, complete, 
and accurate information on contractor performance is available for use in procurement 
source selection” (DOD, 2014, p. 1). In 2009, the administrator of the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (OFPP) identified the CPARS as the federal government-wide 
“solution for collection of contractor performance information” (DOD, 2014, p. vii). 
Furthermore, the OFPP’s memorandum dated January 21, 2011, recommended 
consolidation of contractor performance recording systems into a single recording system, 
the CPARS (DOD, 2014, p. vii). Based on these directives, using CPARS data to evaluate 
contractors’ past performance for the SSIP selection is consistent with current policy.  
FAR 42.15 requires Contractor Performance Information (CPI) to be filled out on 
all contracts exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold (DOD, 2014, p. 4), and the 
contracting officer, contracting officer representative, and product/program manager are 
responsible for accurate data entry into the CPARS. FAR 42.15 defines CPI as relevant 
information used for future source selection purposes on a contractor’s actions assessed 
from previously awarded contracts, including the ratings and supporting narratives (2015). 
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Although the CPARS does not assess subcontractors, the prime contractor’s ability to 
manage subcontractors effectively should be included in the overall assessment of the 
contractor performance.  
Generally, the contractors are rated on six evaluation areas: (a) quality, (b) 
schedule, (c) cost control, (d) management, (e) utilization of business, and (f) regulatory 
compliance (DOD, 2014, p. 22). Assessments of contractor performance are categorized 
into five ratings, which are followed by their narrative explanations. Table 6 illustrates the 
CPARS ratings criteria.  
Table 6.   CPARS Ratings 
Rating Definition 
Exceptional Performance meets contractual requirements and exceeds many to the 
government’s benefit. The contractual performance of the element or sub-
element being evaluated was accomplished with few minor problems for 
which corrective actions taken by the contractor were highly effective. 
Very Good Performance meets contractual requirements and exceeds some to the 
government’s benefit. The contractual performance of the element or sub-
element being evaluated was accomplished with some minor problems for 
which corrective actions taken by the contractor were effective. 
Satisfactory Performance meets contractual requirements. The contractual performance 
of the element or sub-element contains some minor problems for which 
corrective actions taken by the contractor appear or were satisfactory. 
Marginal Performance does not meet some contractual requirements. The contractual 
performance of the element or sub-element being evaluated reflects a serious 
problem for which the contractor has not yet identified corrective actions. 
The contractor’s proposed actions appear only marginally effective or were 
not fully implemented.  
Unsatisfactory Performance does not meet most contractual requirements, and recovery is 
not likely in a timely manner. The contractual performance of the element or 
sub-element contains a serious problem(s) for which the contractor’s 
corrective actions appear or were ineffective.  
Adapted from: Department of Defense (DOD). (2014). Guidance for the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). Washington, DC: Author, p. A2–1. 
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The FAR requires the CPARS evaluation to be completed within 120 days 
following the end of the performance period (DASN[AP], 2013). All completed CPARS 
information feeds into the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS), a 
“single, authorized application to retrieve contractor information” (DOD, 2014, p. 4), 
which is stored to be used for source selection purposes. Figure 4 illustrates the basic 
CPARS workflow. 
Figure 4. Basic CPARS Workflow  
 
Source: Naval Sea Logistics Center Portsmouth. (2013, September). Contractor 




Using CPARS data to evaluate contractors’ past performance is the DOD’s 
mandatory evaluation method; however, the CPARS and the PPIRS data have numerous 
flaws. According to a DOD Inspector General (DOD IG, 2008) report, the DOD CPARS 
did not contain all active contracts over $5 million. Moreover, 39 percent of the contracts 
in the CPARS were registered more than a year late, 68 percent of the performance reports 
were overdue, and 82 percent of the past performance report did not contain sufficient 
narrative assessments to determine the creditable performance ratings. Thus, the DOD did 
not possess all the necessary performance data to make informed decisions on market 
research, contract award, and other acquisition matters (DOD IG, 2008).  
In 2009, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that DOD 
contracting officials did not use contractors’ past performance as one of their factors in 
awarding contracts due to uncertainty in the reliability of past performance data in the 
PPIRS. Only a small percentage of the PPIRS data from 2006 to 2007 contained 
performance assessment, while useful key contracting decisions such as termination for 
default was not in the system. Additionally, lack of standard rating factors across the 
agencies made the PPIRS data even less reliable (GAO, 2009).  
To improve the DOD’s contractor past performance reporting, the DOD 
implemented additional training to the acquisition workforce and provided oversight to 
track reporting requirements. As a result of the additional enforcement, submission of 
required assessment reports increased from 56 to 74 percent from October 2011 to April 
2013. However, even with improvements, the DOD still needs to improve on timely 
submission of assessment reports (GAO, 2013). Figure 5 shows the timeliness of DOD 
contractor performance assessments in fiscal years 2010 to 2012.  
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Figure 5. DOD Contractor Performance Assessment Timeliness 
 
Source: General Accounting Office (GAO). (2013). Contractor performance: Actions 
taken to improve reporting of past performance information (GAO-13-589). Washington, 
DC: Author, p. 10. 
A 2014 GAO report found that the OFPP’s strategy to improve contractor 
performance assessment reporting improved the overall compliance level. The OFPP and 
the FAR Council added additional requirements, such as assigning responsibility and 
accountability, implementing standards for completing evaluations and ensuring submitted 
assessments are consistent with the award fee evaluation. Although the study found the 
improvement encouraging, shortage in workforce and competing priorities may have 
prevented better results (GAO, 2014).  
According to research conducted by Black, Henley, and Clute in 2014, the CPARS 
data contains narratives ratings that are not consistent with objective scores. When the 
narrative rating and the objective scores do not match, the narrative ratings are generally 
weighed more than the objective scores (Black et al., 2014, p. 63). This research revealed 
the inconsistency of contractor performance data in the CPARS, which is used to evaluate 
the source selection decision.  
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The DOD is continuing to emphasize the importance of timely and accurate 
contractor performance assessment in the CPARS, but the improvement is slow. Even with 
deficiencies, the CPARS is the DOD’s solution to track contractors’ performance 
assessments in a centralized system.  
D. SUMMARY 
High performing firms in industry have a long history of leveraging supplier 
management programs to achieve organizational objectives and maintain a competitive 
edge in the market. The first part of this chapter provided an overview on industry supplier 
management programs, background and evolution, key elements of effective programs, 
and some best practice examples. The literature also suggests that future business certainty, 
trust, good communication, and prospects for a win-win outcome are the foundation for 
establishing mutually beneficial relationships.  
The second part of this chapter discussed the DOD’s decision to emulate industry’s 
supplier management program best practices. It provided an overview of the initiatives 
implemented over the years and discussed the DOD’s effort to improve the acquisition 
process. The literature suggests that due to statutes, regulations and policies, the DOD only 
has limited options to incentivize suppliers and is unable to provide the same level of 
benefits as industry.  
The literature review provides a contextual understanding of the requirements and 
key elements of effective supplier management programs and explains the limitations in 
the DOD’s implementation of its supplier incentive programs. This chapter established the 
foundation for our research, which is focused on analyzing the Navy’s Superior Suppliers’ 
proposed benefits. The next chapter discusses the methodology used in our research.  
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This chapter provides an overview of the methodology used for this research. It 
discusses the source of the data and the three frameworks used to analyze the data. The 
frameworks consist of a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) policy analysis, contract 
management process analysis, and risk-benefit analysis.  
B. SOURCE OF DATA  
The DOD announced the Superior Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP) in 2014, 
which was followed by the announcement of the Navy’s choice for the first group of 
Superior Suppliers on June 13, 2014. Following the Navy’s selection of Superior Suppliers, 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy-Acquisition and Procurement (DASN[AP]) 
held the SSIP kickoff meeting with nine first-tier Superior Suppliers on October 24, 2014. 
The purpose of the kickoff meeting was to allow first-tier Superior Suppliers an opportunity 
to identify contract terms and conditions that increased cost or impaired performance that 
could be removed without increasing significant risk to the government (DASN[AP], 
2013). We refer to these as “proposed benefits.”  
The ideas were to be parsed into four categories: (a) changes that only affect Navy 
contracts, (b) changes that only affect the Navy policy or practice, (c) changes to contracts 
that affect a multi-service plant, and (d) changes that affect DOD policies or practices 
(DASN(AP), 2014). First-tier Superior Suppliers provided their proposed ideas between 
December 2014 and January 2015, focusing mostly on requesting benefits from the non-
value-added burden imposed by current statutes or regulations.  
For the purpose of this research, we obtained the sanitized proposed benefits from 
the DASN(AP), none of which contained any company-specific identification information. 
To identify any patterns and consistencies in the 55 proposed benefits, we used three 
different frameworks, each of which is described in detail in the following subsections.  
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C. ACQUISITION FRAMEWORKS 
Our analysis is based on three frameworks: a FAR policy analysis, a contract 
management process analysis, and a risk-benefit analysis. First, we sought to determine 
which federal acquisition policies would be affected if the proposed benefits were 
implemented by matching the proposed benefits to their relevant FAR Part(s). Similarly, 
the second analysis assesses which phase of the contract management process would be 
affected if proposed benefits were granted by matching the proposed benefits to their 
relevant contracting phase(s). Finally, we performed a risk-benefit analysis to determine 
which proposed benefits provide the lowest degree of risk to the government while 
simultaneously providing the highest degree of benefit to the Superior Suppliers. These 
frameworks were selected for our data analysis because they are fundamental to 
understanding how the proposed benefits affect federal contracting regulations and the 
Navy’s contract management policies. We provide additional details for each analysis in 
the following sections.  
1. FAR Policy Analysis  
The FAR is the regulatory base for all federal acquisition and contract management: 
“The Federal Acquisition Regulations System is established for the codification and 
publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies” 
(FAR 1.101). The FAR policy analysis matched proposed benefits to their relevant policies 
to assess which federal acquisition policies might be affected if proposed benefits were 
granted. The purpose of this analysis is to identify any patterns or consistencies in order to 
highlight regulations that our Superior Suppliers find particularly burdensome. Based on 
our findings, we ranked the FAR policies with the most proposed benefits to FAR policies 
with the least proposed benefits. The results provide insight to Navy acquisition leadership 
regarding FAR policies that cause the most concern to the Superior Suppliers.  
2. Contract Management Process  
The six phases of the contract management process are used in industry and 
government as a roadmap to guide organizational leaders and acquisition professionals 
through the complex contracting process. According to Garrett (2007), the contract 
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management process is “the art and science of managing a contractual agreement(s) 
throughout the contracting process” (p. 390). The six phases of contract management 
process are as follows:  
(a) Procurement Planning, “the process of identifying which business needs can be 
best met by procuring products or services outside the organization;  
(b) Solicitation Planning, “the preparation of the documents needed to support a 
solicitation”; 
(c) Solicitation, “a process through which a buyer requests, bids, quotes, tenders or 
proposes orally, in writing, electronically”;  
(d) Source Selection, “the process by which the buyer evaluates offers, selects a 
seller, negotiates terms and conditions, and awards the contract”; 
(e) Contract Administration, “the process of ensuing compliance with contractual 
terms and conditions during contract performance up to contract closeout or termination” 
and  
(f) Contract Closeout or Termination, “the process of verifying that all 
administrative matters are concluded on a contract that is otherwise physically complete” 
or “an action taken pursuant to a contract clause in which the buyer unilaterally ends all or 
parts of the work” (Garrett, 2007, pp. 390-407).  
It is important to understand the inter-relationships between each phase and how 
each phase fits into the overall contract management process. Figure 6 demonstrates the 
specific inputs and outputs required for each phase of the contract management process.  
For this analysis, we matched the proposed benefits to their relevant contract 
management phase(s). The purpose of this analysis is to identify any patterns or 
consistencies in the data in order to identify the contract management phases that are 
causing the most concern to the Superior Suppliers. 
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Figure 6. Contract Management Process: Buyer’s Steps 
 
Adapted from: Garrett, G. A. (2007). World class contracting (4th ed.). Riverwoods, IL: 
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, p. 21. 
3. Risk-Benefit Analysis 
The risk-benefit analysis seeks to understand the risk-benefit tradeoff of each of the 
55 proposed benefits. Many acquisition statutes and regulations are in place to reduce risk 
to the government. If the DOD decides to provide the proposed benefits to the Superior 
Suppliers, the associated risks to the government may increase. The purpose of this analysis 
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is to examine and understand the level of risk to the government and the level of benefit to 
the Superior Suppliers, should the benefits be granted. For this analysis, we assigned risk 
ratings and benefit ratings (along with justifications for those ratings) to each proposed 
benefit. Then we plotted the ratings on a 2x2 risk-benefit analysis matrix in order to 
determine which proposed benefits presented the least risk to the government and the 
highest benefit to the Superior Suppliers.  
The risk-benefit analysis matrix is divided into four quadrants. Quadrant one 
represents proposed benefits with low risk to the government and high benefit to the 
Superior Suppliers. Quadrant two represents proposed benefits with high risk to the 
government and high benefit to the Superior Suppliers. Quadrant three contains proposed 
benefits that are low risk to the government and low benefit to the Superior Suppliers. 
Finally, quadrant four consists of proposed benefits that are high risk to the government 
and low benefit to the Superior Suppliers.  
This risk-benefit analysis matrix provides Navy acquisition leadership a 
prioritization schema for implementing the proposed benefits. For a proposed benefit to be 
considered, it should meet two conditions: substantial benefit to the Superior Suppliers and 
tolerable risk to the government. For example, the proposed benefits that fall into the low-
risk, high-benefit quadrant would presumably be first priority items, while those that fall 
into the high-risk, low-benefit quadrant would be last priority items. Figure 7 is an 
example of the Risk-Benefit Analysis Matrix.  
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This chapter presented an overview of the methods used for analyzing the Navy’s 
Superior Suppliers’ proposed benefits using three frameworks: FAR policy analysis, 
contract management process analysis, and risk-benefit analysis. The purpose of the first 
two analyses is to reveal which FAR policies and phase(s) of the contract management 
process would be most affected if the proposed benefits were granted. The purpose of the 
last analysis is to determine the priority for implementation of the proposed benefits by 
examining the anticipated risk to the government and benefit to the Superior Suppliers. The 
next chapter discusses the findings of each analysis. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results and findings of three analyses. 
The chapter begins with a presentation of the primary data received from DASN(AP) and 
discusses patterns or consistencies identified by applying the analyses described in Chapter 
III. This discussion focuses on (a) parts of the FAR that present the most burdens for the
Superior Suppliers, (b) phases of the contract management process that present the most 
challenges for the contractors, and (c) low risk-high benefit proposed benefits with 
potential to yield the most value for both the government and Superior Suppliers. The 
second section answers the research questions and discusses implications.  
B. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Data analysis and findings are presented in the following order: overview of the 
primary data, FAR policy analysis, contract management process analysis, and risk-benefit 
analysis. 
1. Overview of the Primary Data
This section provides a basic analysis of the primary data received from the 
DASN(AP). The sanitized list of 55 proposed benefits from the Navy’s first-tier Superior 
Suppliers of 2014 was obtained from the DASN(AP) on June 8, 2015. The DASN(AP) 
grouped the proposed benefits into seven categories: improve contract financing, clauses 
or data submission, reduce oversight, reduce performance requirement, profit, delegate 
government authority, and general. Figure 8 shows the number of the proposed benefits 
for each category and the overall distributions.  
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Figure 8. Proposed Benefits Categorized by the DASN(AP) 
Source: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy–Acquisition and Procurement 
(DASN[AP]), personal communication, June 8, 2015. 
Based on the DASN(AP) categorization, the top three categories are General, 
Reduce Performance Requirements, and Reduce Oversight. The General category has the 
highest number of proposed benefits from the Superior Suppliers at 34.55%. However, 
the General category includes varieties of proposed benefits that could not be categorized 
into the other six categories. The Reduce Performance Requirement category includes 
items related to Earned Value Management (EVM), Contract Data Requirements Lists 
(CDRL), and a number of reporting and approval requirements. The Reduce Oversight 
category contains proposed benefits mostly related to administrative requirements such as 
audits and inspections. Appendix B provides the complete list of the primary data from 
the DASN(AP). 
 Upon completing the review of the DASN(AP) data, we determined the 
DASN(AP) categorization is preliminary and only provides a basic analysis. To identify 
patterns, consistencies, and implications effectively, we applied three additional data 
analysis frameworks: FAR policy analysis, contract management process analysis, and 
risk-benefit analysis. The following sections provide the findings of the three additional 
analyses.  
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2. FAR Policy Analysis 
In FAR policy analysis, the proposed benefits are matched to their relevant FAR 
policies—policies that may be affected if the proposed benefits were granted. The purpose 
of this analysis is to identify patterns or consistencies in the FAR policies that the Superior 
Suppliers deem most burdensome.  
There are three limitations in this analysis that are worthy of mention. First, the 
FAR policy categorization is somewhat subjective. The data received from the DASN(AP) 
was sanitized to mask the specific contractor requests (i.e., we only received summarized 
statements); thus, in some cases, interpretation was required to determine the most relevant 
FAR reference(s). To ensure accurate coding, each researcher coded the proposed benefits 
individually, and then we used discussions to achieve 100% coding agreement for each 
proposed benefit. Second, seven proposed benefits appear to affect more than one FAR 
policy. For the purpose of this research, all relevant FAR policies were considered, thus it 
is possible for one proposed benefit to represent more than one FAR policy. Third, six 
proposed benefits did not have direct FAR references. Instead, they referred to policies at 
the department (DOD) level, service (Navy) level, and Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA)/Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) instructions. For the purpose 
of this research, the proposed benefits referring to lower level policies were traced back to 
the corresponding FAR policies and categorized accordingly. Table 7 reflects the number 
of the proposed benefits for each FAR policy affected and the overall distributions.  
Table 7.   FAR Policy Analysis 
FAR Policy # of Proposed 
Benefits 
Distribution 
Part 42: Contract Administration and Audit 
Services 
13 20.97% 
Part 15: Contracting by Negotiation 10 16.13% 
Part 32: Contract Financing 8 12.90% 
Part 16: Types of Contract 7 11.29% 
Part 46: Quality Assurance 6 9.68% 
Part 34: Major System Acquisition 5 8.06% 
Part 37: Service Contracting 3 4.84% 
Part 9: Contractor Qualification 2 3.23% 
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FAR Policy # of Proposed 
Benefits 
Distribution 
Part 44: Subcontracting Policies and Procedures 2 3.23% 
Part 45: Government Property 2 3.23% 
Part 22: Application of Labor Laws to 
Government Acquisitions 
1 1.61% 
Part 25: Foreign Acquisition 1 1.61% 
Part 39: Acquisition of Information Technology 1 1.61% 
Part 48: Value Engineering 1 1.61% 
Total 62 100% 
 
 
The FAR policy analysis revealed that the top three most frequently mentioned 
FAR policies by the Superior Suppliers in their proposed benefits were FAR Part 42, 
Contract Administration and Audit Services (20.97%); FAR Part 15, Contracting by 
Negotiation (16.13%); and FAR Part 32, Contract Financing (12.90%). Appendix B 
provides the complete FAR policy analysis results. 
3. Contract Management Process Analysis 
In contract management process analysis, the proposed benefits were matched with 
their relevant phase(s) of the contract management process. The purpose of this analysis is 
to identify patterns or consistencies in relation to contract management process and identify 
the phase(s) that present(s) the most concerns for the Superior Suppliers.  
Two limitations were identified during the contract management process analysis. 
First, as a result of the same sanitization procedures described above, contract management 
process categorization is somewhat subjective. The same coding process was used to 
achieve 100% code agreement. Second, eight proposed benefits affected two contract 
management phases, and three proposed benefits affected three contract management 
phases. For the purpose of this research, all relevant contract management phases were 
considered, thus it is possible for one proposed benefit to represent more than one contract 
management phase. Table 8 reflects the number of the proposed benefits for each contract 
management phase and the overall distributions.  
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Table 8.   Contract Management Process Analysis 
Contract Management 
Phase 
# of Proposed Benefits Distribution 
Procurement Planning 7 10.14% 
Solicitation Planning 11 15.94% 
Solicitation 2 2.90% 
Source Selection 11 15.94% 
Contract Administration 36 52.17% 
Contract Close Out 2 2.90% 
Total 69 100% 
 
 
The contract management process analysis revealed that the top three most 
frequently mentioned contract management process phases were Contract Administration 
(52.17%), Solicitation Planning (15.94%), and Source Selection (15.94%). Appendix B 
provides the complete results of the contract management process analysis. 
4. Risk-Benefit Analysis 
The risk-benefit analysis seeks to understand the risk-benefit tradeoffs of each of 
the 55 proposed benefits. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the degree of 
increased risk to the government in exchange for the degree of increased benefit to the 
Superior Suppliers, if a proposed benefit were to be implemented. This analysis provides a 
sort of prioritization schema for the Navy by identifying which proposed benefits would 
be the easiest to implement (in terms of risk to the government) and provide the greatest 
return to the Superior Suppliers (in terms of benefit or ease of burden).  
In risk-benefit analysis, each proposed benefit was assigned a risk rating and a 
benefit rating. The original methodology contained only two rating criteria, high and low. 
However, during the course of the analysis, we discovered that a number of proposed 
benefits did not have clear risk or benefit ratings because the ratings could change based 
on other conditions, such as dollar value of contract, acquisition phase, and so forth. To 
overcome these challenges and improve accuracy, we added three additional rating criteria: 
medium, high/medium, and low/medium. We modified the risk-benefit analysis matrix 
accordingly.  
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Figure 9 plots the 55 proposed benefits based on their risk and benefit ratings. 
Quadrant one represents the proposed benefits with low risk to the government and high 
benefit to the Superior Suppliers. The proposed benefits in quadrant one should be the 
priority for policy change consideration. Quadrant two represents proposed benefits with 
high risk to the government and high benefit to the Superior Suppliers. Quadrant three 
represents proposed benefits with high risk to the government while returning low benefit 
to the Superior Suppliers. Quadrant four represents proposed benefits with low risk to the 
government and low benefit to the Superior Suppliers. Finally, the dotted square in the 
center represents those proposed benefits with ambiguous risk or benefit ratings of 
medium, high/medium, or low/medium.  




The risk-benefit analysis revealed the following results: 20 proposed benefits in 
quadrant one (low risk/high benefit), 18 proposed benefits in quadrant two (high risk/high 
benefit), zero proposed benefit in quadrant three (low risk/low benefit), and zero proposed 
benefit in quadrant four (high risk/low benefit). Finally, 17 proposed benefits have 
ambiguous risk or benefit ratings and were placed in the middle square. Appendix C 
provides the complete risk-benefit analysis results. The next section discusses the 
implication of the data analysis findings.  
C. DISCUSSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section discusses the implications of the findings from our three analyses. For 
the sake of brevity, we focus only on those proposed benefits located in quadrant one: those 
representing low risk to the government and high benefit to the Superior Suppliers. Because 
these proposed benefits are considered the priority for implementation, we feel it is prudent 
to examine them more closely. Quadrants two, three, and four and the center square are not 
analyzed any further in this research. Appendix D demonstrates the complete list of 
proposed benefits in quadrant one. 
In the next step, the proposed benefits in quadrant one were analyzed using contract 
management process analysis and FAR policy analysis. Table 9 reflects the proposed 
benefits in quadrant one categorized and analyzed by contract management phase.1  
                                                 
1 This research considered all relevant contract management phases for each proposal. We identified 
six of the 20 proposed benefits representing more than one contract management phase, bringing the 
overall number to 27.   
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Table 9.   Quadrant One Proposed Benefits by Contract Management Process 
Contract Management Phase FAR Part(s) # of Proposed Benefits Distribution 
Procurement Planning 16, 37, 39 5 19% 
Solicitation Planning 16, 37 6 22% 
Solicitation   N/A 0 0% 
Source Selection 15, 42 3 11% 
Contract Administration 
15, 32, 34, 42, 45, 
46, 48 11 41% 
Contract Closeout 32, 42 2 7% 
 Total 27 100% 
 
 
Nearly half (41%) of the proposed benefits are in the contract administration phase, 
which suggests there are business practices in the contract administration phase that are 
causing concerns for the Superior Suppliers. Digging deeper into the FAR policies 
associated with the proposed benefits in quadrant one, we find that FAR Part 42, Contract 
Administration and Audit Services (21%), is the most frequently mentioned policy. This 
provides robustness to the finding that contract administration policies are causing the most 
concerns for the Superior Suppliers. Table 10 reflects the proposed benefits categorized 
and analyzed by FAR policies.2  
                                                 
2 This research considered all relevant FAR policies for each proposed benefit. We identified that five 
of the 20 proposed benefits represent more than one FAR policy, bringing the overall number to 24.   
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Table 10.   Quadrant One: FAR Analysis of Contract Administration Phase  
FAR Part # of Proposed Benefits Distribution 
Part 15: Contracting by Negotiation 3 13% 
Part 16: Types of Contract 4 17% 
Part 32: Contract Financing 2 8% 
Part 34: Major System Acquisition 2 8% 
Part 37: Service Contracting 3 13% 
Part 39: Acquisition of Information 
Technology 1 4% 
Part 42: Contract Administration and 
Audit Services 5 21% 
Part 45: Government Property 2 8% 
Part 46: Quality Assurance 1 4% 
Part 48: Value Engineering 1 4% 
Total 24 100% 
 
 
In summary, we conducted data analysis using three frameworks: the FAR policy, 
contract management process, and risk-benefit analysis. The purpose of the first two 
frameworks was to identify patterns or consistencies in the 55 proposed benefits and to 
investigate if there is/are area(s) in the FAR and contract management process causing 
concerns for the Superior Suppliers. We discovered that the contract administration phase 
and FAR Part 42 are the most frequently mentioned areas in the 55 proposed benefits. This 
implies that perhaps the contract administration phase, specifically policies related to FAR 
Part 42, is causing frustration for the Superior Suppliers. The purpose of the third 
framework was to identify the implementation prioritization schedule for the proposed 
benefits. We identified 20 proposed benefits as low risk to the government and high benefit 
to the Superior Suppliers as the priority for policy change consideration.  
In the next step, we applied the FAR policy and contract management process 
analysis to the 20 proposed benefits in quadrant one and discovered that the contract 
administration phase and FAR Part 42 are the most frequently mentioned areas of concern. 
These findings suggest that there may be numerous policy change opportunities in the 
contract administration phase and FAR Part 42. Furthermore, these opportunities are 
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potentially low risk to the government and high benefit to the Superior Suppliers, which 
can be used to incentivize the Superior Suppliers and support the Navy’s SSIP. 
Based on the consolidated analysis findings, we were able to identify six proposed 
benefits from the original 55 proposed benefits as the priority for taking action. These six 
proposed benefits are listed in Table 11. We recommend Navy acquisition leadership conduct 
further study on these six proposed benefits to determine the feasibility for SSIP 
implementation.  
Table 11.   SSIP Implementation Priority 
# TITLE SUMMARY OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
2 Modification of DOD prompt payment 
requirements to accelerate final delivery 
payments 
Authorize DFAS to accelerate all invoice payments from 30 
days to 7 days after receipt of a proper invoice or acceptance of 
supplies or services performance. 
14 Reduce Government Property Audits Request that Government Property Audits and DCAA 
Consumption Audits be reduced. Also request duplicate audits 
be eliminated. 
36 Priority for DCAA/DCMA Business Systems 
Reviews 
Request priority scheduling for Business Systems Reviews 
48 FAR 52.248-1, “Valuing Engineering” (Feb 
2000) 
Request discussions surrounding the ability of Navy activities 
(via its supplements and/or directives) to encourage the use and 
implementation of value engineering changes. 
49 Cost Performance assessment Report— 
Utilization of Small Business Rating Area 
Contractor has observed potentially inconsistent consideration 
in U.S. Navy and DOD application of assessments for the 
“utilization of small business” rating area. Request review of 
the disparity between “outstanding” performance under 
DCMA rating versus different rating under Navy CPAR 
assessments.  
50 “Head of the line” privileges—Support 
completion of audits and analysis 
This request is about establishing an environment where 
Superior Suppliers are treated differently. The premise is that 
those suppliers designated as superior would require less 




This chapter discussed the findings, implications, and recommendations of our 
research. The findings of the data analyses suggest that there may be numerous policy 
change opportunities in the contract administration phase and FAR Part 42, Contract 
Administration and Audit Services, that would be low risk to the government and high 
benefit to Superior Suppliers. Finally, we recommended six proposed benefits to the Navy 
acquisition leadership as priority for SSIP implementation. The next chapter presents the 
summary, research conclusion, and areas for further research.  
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The DOD’s SSIP of 2013 sought to adopt industry best practices in supply and 
supplier management and explore opportunities to provide the first-tier Superior 
Suppliers with benefits or reliefs that would reduce administrative burdens, streamline 
processes, and eliminate non-value-added requirements. With the right incentives, it is 
possible for the defense industry to improve cost, schedule, and performance in DOD 
acquisitions, which could result in a win-win outcome for both the government and 
industry.  
This research provided a literature review on supply and supplier management in 
industry, examined the benefits to buyers and suppliers, discussed industry best practices, 
and illustrated how the DOD could adopt industry best practices to incentivize defense 
contractors to improve performance.  
The DON took the first step toward building trust and relationships with its 
Superior Suppliers by giving the first-tier Superior Suppliers (selected in 2014) an 
opportunity to submit white papers to the DASN(AP) suggesting possible reliefs or 
benefits that would improve efficiency and reduce non-value-added requirements. We 
obtained the 55 sanitized proposed benefits from the DASN(AP) and conducted data 
analysis using three frameworks: FAR policy, contract management process, and risk-
benefit analyses. Upon completion of our analyses, we identified six proposed benefits as 
the priority for policy change consideration.  
B. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to look for patterns or consistencies in the 55 
proposed benefits and develop a prioritization schedule for implementing the proposed 
benefits. Results from the analyses were used to identify implications for the SSIP and 
DOD contract management policy. The conclusion of this research are next discussed in 
terms of our research questions:  
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1. How can the benefits proposed by the Superior Suppliers be analyzed 
to provide insight to Navy acquisition leadership?  
The FAR policy analysis, contract management process analysis, and risk-benefit 
analysis were used to analyze the 55 proposed benefits by the Superior Suppliers to 
provide insight to the Navy acquisition leadership. These frameworks were selected 
because they are fundamental to understanding and implementing DOD procurement and 
contract management.  
The FAR is the regulatory base for all federal acquisition and contract 
management. Although each agency may establish supplements to the FAR or local 
instructions to address agency-specific acquisition needs, the FAR is the primary 
authority and foundation for all service-specific supplements and instructions. As such, it 
is an ideal reference to examine patterns or consistencies in the proposed benefits. The 
six phases of the contract management process are used in both industry and government 
as a roadmap to guide organizational leaders and acquisition professionals through the 
complex contracting process. The six phases also provide a sound reference for 
examining patterns or consistencies among the proposed benefits. The risk-benefit 
analysis allowed us to understand whether the risk/benefit tradeoff was worthy of policy 
modification to implement proposed benefits. For a proposed benefit to be considered, it 
should meet two conditions: substantial benefit increase to the Superior Suppliers and 
reasonable risk to the government. This analysis method has the additional benefit of 
prioritizing potential policy changes for DON acquisition leaders. 
The application of these three data analysis frameworks allowed us to identify 
patterns or consistencies in the 55 proposed benefits. Our research has identified the areas 
of the FAR and contract management process that caused the most frustration for the 
Superior Suppliers. Nearly 21% of the proposed benefits were related to FAR Part 42, 
Contract Administration and Audit Services, and over 52% of the proposed benefits were 
identified as occurring in the contract administration phase. Further, six of the 20 low-
risk, high-benefit proposed benefits (i.e., those priority items in quadrant one) concerned 
relief from contract administration policies/procedures. We recommend that these 
proposed benefits are given priority in policy change considerations.  
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2. What are the implications of the analysis of the Superior Suppliers’ 
proposed benefits for DOD contract management policy?  
The application of the three data analysis frameworks allowed us to identify 
patterns or consistencies in the 55 proposed benefits and provided two useful points of 
reference. First, we identified the FAR parts and contract management phases that caused 
the most concerns for the Superior Suppliers. If certain FAR parts and contract 
management phases were mentioned repeatedly in the proposed benefits, we can infer the 
Superior Suppliers were frustrated with the requirements and current practices associated 
with these FAR Parts and contract management processes. Second, we identified the 
prioritization schema for implementing the proposed benefits. For a proposed benefit to 
be considered, it should meet two conditions: substantial benefit to the Superior Suppliers 
and tolerable risk to the government. Our research identified six proposed benefits that 
meet these criteria and are the priority for policy change consideration.  
The results of the analysis can be used as a surrogate measure to identify areas for 
potential improvement in the DOD’s current acquisition practices. If the Superior 
Suppliers repeatedly mentioned certain areas of concern in their proposed benefits, we 
can assume the policies and requirements cause frustrations to the Superior Suppliers and 
perhaps have the same effects on most or all defense contractors. Therefore, the results of 
the analyses open doors for further research on areas for improvement in the DOD’s 
acquisition processes to allow greater efficiency and to improve buyer-supplier 
relationships.  
C. AREA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
We recommend the following actions for further research: 
The scope of this research was limited to the small sample size of the Navy defense 
contractors. Therefore, it is recommended that Superior Suppliers feedback is also obtained 
from the Army and Air Force to conduct data analysis on proposed benefits for all services, 
thus enabling the identification of patterns or consistencies for the DOD as a whole.  
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The interpretation of the data was subjective. Therefore, it is recommended that a 
different group of researchers conducts the data analysis to see whether the results lead to 
the same conclusions.  
The risk-benefit analysis was based on the government’s perspective. Therefore, it 
is recommended that the risk-benefit analysis is conducted from the perspective of the 




APPENDIX A. QUESTIONS ASKED TO INDUSTRY  
1. What clauses are currently being used in government subcontracts and 
commercial contracts and subcontracts to incentivize superior 
performance at the corporate level in the areas of cost, schedule, 
performance, quality, and business relations? 
2. What solicitation provisions, contract clauses, and performance incentives 
will provide contractors with the greatest motivation to achieve preferred 
supplier status?  
3. Energy efficiency is a critical DON requirement significantly impacting 
the successful achievement of the DON’s missions. How should a 
contractor’s use of energy, as it relates to the entire life cycle of a 
product—design, manufacture, use, maintenance, and disposal—be 
considered in the designation of Preferred Suppliers? 
4. Is there any other aspect of the proposed Preferred Suppliers Program on 
which you wish to comment? (DASN[A&LM], 2010, p. 28,789). 
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